Talks, slide by slide.

1. 01

   LocoMocoSec · Kaua'i · 2024 · 78 slides keynote

   A Recipe for Scaling (Web) Security

   Lessons from Google's Frontlines

   How Google cut XSS across hundreds of apps: fix root causes in the browser, ship frameworks that are safe by default, and patch legacy code with data and tooling.

   • 6Google's web footprint: 600+ subdomains, 900+ sensitive apps, a trillion requests
   • 36Patching in app code is easy but does not scale; patching the platform scales most
   • 48Twelve security features, each moved from opt-in to default to enforced

   view → · pdf ↓ 7.3 MB

2. 02

   SIGS — Security Interest Group Switzerland · Zürich · 2026 · 76 slides

   From Prompt Injections to Rogue Actions

   Securing AI Agents in Practice

   How prompt injection makes an agent leak data or go rogue, and how Google layers defenses: a policy engine, hardened models, and sanitized output.

   • 25The lethal trifecta: sensitive data, untrusted context, the power to act
   • 34Demo: an injected review makes the travel agent exfiltrate a door code
   • 50Google's defense in depth: policy enforcement, reasoning defenses, testing

   view → · pdf ↓ 5.0 MB

3. 03

   NDSS MADWeb · San Diego · 2025 · 41 slides

   Security Signals

   Making Web Security Posture Measurable At Scale

   How Google measures the security posture of 8,000+ web services from sampled HTTP traffic, then uses it to drive and track rollouts.

   • 3The scale: 8,000+ services, ~1,000 domains, trillions of requests
   • 7Architecture: the reverse proxy feeds the signal store
   • 29Four years of Trusted Types coverage, past 600 services

   view → · pdf ↓ 2.0 MB

4. 04

   SecAppDev · Leuven · 2023 · 75 slides

   Modern Security Features

   for web applications

   Four browser features that stop XSS and cross-site leaks: nonce CSP, Trusted Types, Fetch Metadata and COOP, with Google's adoption numbers from 2019 to 2023.

   • 49More than 95% of allowlist CSPs on the web are bypassable
   • 53Google 2019: CSP blocked 78% of XSS on the most sensitive domains
   • 64CSP at Google in 2023: 85% of traffic, 300+ domains, 700+ services

   view → · pdf ↓ 3.9 MB

5. 05

   Google I/O · Mountain View · 2019 · 60 slides

   Securing web apps with modern platform features

   Four browser features that stop XSS and cross-site attacks: nonce-based CSP, Trusted Types, Fetch Metadata and Cross-Origin Opener Policy.

   • 62018 bug bounty payouts: XSS alone is 35.6%
   • 19Gmail's real allowlist CSP, a full page of hosts, struck through
   • 51A complete Fetch Metadata isolation check in ten lines

   view → · pdf ↓ 3.1 MB · video ↗

6. 06

   LocoMocoSec · Kaua'i · 2019 · 56 slides

   Content Security Policy

   A successful mess between hardening and mitigation

   Google's 2018 data: a nonce-based CSP blocked 60 to 80% of reported XSS. Five policy levels, ending at nonce-only.

   • 13The case study: 7 of 9 XSS blocked on the most sensitive domains
   • 16Which sink each reported XSS used
   • 22CSP levels L1 to L4: adoption effort against covered sinks

   view → · pdf ↓ 2.7 MB

The full list — 37 talks and lectures since 2009 — lives at ~/talks. Want one of these on your stage? Invite me.